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1

loopholes in existing federal law. Specifically, BCRA sought to
reduce or eliminate the use of so-called “soft money”—funds not
subject to the source and amount restrictions imposed on direct
2
To
campaign contributions—to influence federal elections.
achieve this goal, BCRA substantially expanded the scope of federal
regulation to include activities that relate to or could affect federal
elections, such as communications about persons who are federal
candidates during the period leading up to an election, as well as
3
voter registration and get-out-the-vote activities.
As the scope of federal regulation expands, it increasingly
comes into contact and conflict with state-level election activity. To
the extent that federal regulations affect the activities of political
actors in state candidate elections, they have only moderate impact
because most states regulate the source and amount of
contributions to candidate elections in a way that echoes the
requirements of federal law. Expanding federal regulation in this
area therefore does not require substantial modifications in the
behavior of those who attempt to influence state elections that
occur in tandem with federal elections.
However, state ballot measures pose a very different problem.
In the twenty-four U.S. states with the power of initiative or
4
referendum, citizens have the constitutional right to vote directly
on proposed constitutional and statutory amendments. Also,
citizens in the states with initiative have the power to propose
amendments themselves. Perhaps because there is no equivalent
federal authority, federal law has never particularly focused on this
area of state election activity. The Internal Revenue Service even
treats state political committees organized to support ballot
measures in a different category of tax exemption than political
committees organized to support either federal or state
5
candidates.
With the expansion of federal regulation, state-level ballot
measure activities are now within the ambit of federal regulation.
But under existing Supreme Court precedent, contributions to
1. See infra Part II.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. M. DANE WATERS, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ALMANAC 11 (2003).
5. Judith E. Kindall & John Francis Reilly, Election Year Issues, 2002 EXEMPT
ORGS. CONTINUING PROF’L EDUC. TEXT 402, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-tege/eotopici02.pdf.
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ballot measure campaigns cannot be limited by source or amount.
Consequently, tensions have resulted from this new interaction
between federal regulation and state citizens’ exercise of their
retained legislative power.
This article explores the tensions between the federal desire to
stamp out political activity that evades campaign finance reform
efforts and the deference due in our federalist system to states
whose citizens have chosen to retain legislative power over
initiatives and referenda. We proceed by setting forth a brief
history of the initiative and referendum power and of federal
7
campaign finance law, followed by a more in-depth description of
the expansive provisions in BCRA and their impact on ballot
8
measure activities. We conclude with recommendations about
how to balance the competing interests and concerns of federal
9
regulators and state citizens involved in direct democracy.
I.

THE NATURE OF AND JUSTIFICATION FOR DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN
THE STATES

Both initiative (citizens’ power to propose constitutional or
statutory amendments) and referendum (citizen ratification of
legislative measures) are forms of direct democracy. Direct
democracy has existed in the United States since colonial times,
when town hall meetings in New England colonies served as forums
10
for citizen-proposed ordinances. Some of the Framers expressed
strong opposition to direct democracy, favoring instead a
republican structure of government to filter and diminish the
11
factionalism they feared was inherent in purely democratic rule.
Others believed that some forms of direct democracy were a
necessary recognition of their shared theory that the people were
sovereign and that the existence of government was justified only
6. See infra Part II.
7. Id.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. WATERS, supra note 4, at 3; K.K. DuVivier, State Ballot Initiatives in the
Federal Preemption Equation: A Medical Marijuana Case Study, 40 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 221, 230 (2005).
11. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 61–62 (James Madison) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961). For a more complex and detailed account of the views of the
Founders on direct and popular democracy, see Alan Gibson, Democracy and the
Founders’ Constitution: Toward a Balanced Assessment, in UNDERSTANDING THE
FOUNDING: THE CRUCIAL QUESTIONS 46–90 (2007).
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12

by the consent of the governed.
To that end, the Framers
determined that ratification of the U.S. Constitution should be by
the citizens of the several states sitting in convention, rather than
13
by the state legislatures.
Adoption of direct democracy in the states began with the
ratification of the Massachusetts Constitution by statewide
14
By 1857, Congress required that every new state
referendum.
entering the union incorporate the requirement that state
constitutional changes would be made by legislative proposal
referred to the people for ultimate adoption, and today, every state
has a legislative referendum process that permits the legislature to
refer constitutional and statutory measures to the voters for final
15
approval. Twenty-four states also permit popular referendums, in
which the voters may, by petition, refer measures already passed by
16
the legislature to the people for them to accept or reject.
Citizen initiatives, in which citizens can propose constitutional
and statutory provisions to be adopted by popular vote, arose later
in our history. The initiative, along with other measures including
direct election of senators, primary elections, secret ballots, and
recall, was part of a package of reforms promoted by the Populist
12. WATERS, supra note 4, at 3 (citing Thomas Jefferson’s support for the
power of legislative referendum in his state’s constitution); see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 339 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961):
As the people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from
them that the constitutional charter, under which the several branches of
government hold their power, is derived; it seems strictly consonant to
the republican theory, to recur to the same original authority . . .
whenever it may be necessary to enlarge, diminish, or new-model the
powers of government . . . .
For an overview of political science research rebutting some of the critiques levied
by classical political theorists against direct democracy, see Ian Budge, Direct
Democracy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 595, 596–97 (R.
A. W. Rhodes et al. eds., 2006).
13. U.S. CONST. art. VII; see also DuVivier, supra note 10, at 229–30 (noting
that the Framers’ choice of ratification by convention indicates that their choice of
a republican form of government did not represent a repudiation of popular
sovereignty).
14. WATERS, supra note 4, at 3. An earlier attempt to include a requirement
of conventions to amend the Georgia Constitution failed. Id. For a general
history of state constitutional tradition of direct democracy, see G. Alan Tarr, For
the People: Direct Democracy in the State Constitutional Tradition, in DEMOCRACY: HOW
DIRECT?, 87–99 (Eliott Abrams ed., 2002).
15. WATERS, supra note 4, at 3, 11; DuVivier, supra note 10, at 230–31. For a
detailed account of the circumstances in which citizens in each state obtained the
power of initiative, referendum, or both, see WATERS, supra note 4, at 37–453.
16. WATERS, supra note 4, at 11.
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and Progressive movements that rose to prominence around the
17
turn of the twentieth century. The Progressives and Populists can
certainly be seen as self-interested in their support for the popular
initiative, which provided them with a mechanism to adopt their
reform platform despite the opposition of the state legislatures they
were trying to reform. Nonetheless, by creating a permanent
mechanism for direct citizen sponsorship of laws, they created a
mechanism that would likewise benefit future generations in
resolving issues on which legislative action failed. The use of the
initiative in the intervening century has borne out their wishes,
resulting in the adoption of measures that were unlikely to secure
legislative approval, such as expanding suffrage, imposing
legislative term limits, providing for campaign finance reforms and
publicly funded elections, establishing citizen redistricting
18
commissions, and imposing limits on taxation. The initiative was
also used to address controversial social issues including minority
languages, civil rights, the death penalty, physician-assisted suicide,
19
and abortion. Many see progress from these measures, but the
initiative has been critiqued as permitting majority biases to
20
trample on individual rights.
As the use of initiatives and
referenda have become more frequent and expenditures on
campaigns for and against such ballot measures have increased,
critics of direct democracy have also raised concerns about the
corrupting influence of money on the process, citing large influxes
of money from single donors, including corporate and labor union
21
sources.
These most recent controversies highlight a key difference
between state ballot measure campaigns and candidate elections at
the federal level. Federal law prohibits the expenditure of
corporate or union treasury funds to influence an election and
17. Id. at 3; Catherine Engberg, Taking the Initiative: May Congress Reform State
Initiative Lawmaking to Guarantee a Republican Form of Government?, 54 STAN. L. REV.
569, 573 (2001).
18. WATERS, supra note 4, at 7. For a detailed, interstate analysis and
comparison of the issues addressed by state ballot measures, see id. at 481–520.
19. Id. at 7.
20. See Philip P. Frickey, The Communion of Strangers: Representative Government,
Direct Democracy, and the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
421, 442 (1998). See generally Derrick A. Bell, The Referendum: Democracy’s Barrier to
Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1978).
21. See generally DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED : INITIATIVE
CAMPAIGNS AND THE POWER OF MONEY (2000); PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST:
CALIFORNIA’S EXPERIENCE, AMERICA’S FUTURE (1998).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008

5

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 6
5. PERL -

ADC.docm

596

2/3/2008 2:31:46 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:2

imposes caps on the amount any particular contributor can give
directly to a candidate campaign or to other groups that make
expenditures to influence candidate elections, such as political
22
The United States
action committees and political parties.
Supreme Court struck down attempts to impose such “source” and
“amount” restrictions on state ballot measure campaigns, finding
that in the absence of the quid-pro-quo corruption argument that
applies in the candidate election context, such restrictions cannot
be supported in the face of the First Amendment’s protections of
23
political speech. California’s recent attempt to impose amount
restrictions on contributions to ballot measure committees actually
controlled by candidates likewise was struck down on constitutional
grounds, despite legitimate concerns that such candidates are wellpositioned to use the unrestricted funds raised by a committee they
24
control for the benefit of their re-election campaigns.
The lack of source and amount restrictions on contributions to
committees that support or oppose ballot measures does not mean
that contributions to ballot measure campaigns are wholly
unregulated. Rather, campaign finance regulation in the ballot
measure arena exists largely in the form of disclosure requirements
22. 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a, 441b (Supp. 2005). See infra Part II for a more detailed
discussion of these restrictions.
23. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981)
(striking down limitations on contributions to ballot measure committees); First
Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (striking down
prohibition on corporate contributions to ballot measure campaigns). After the
Supreme Court’s decision in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), several
commentators suggested that the constitutionality of contribution limitations to
ballot measures might have been revitalized. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Rethinking
the Constitutionality of Contribution & Expenditure Limits in Ballot Measure Campaigns,
78 S. CAL. L. R EV. 885 (2005). However, those commentators were writing before
the Court’s subsequent decision in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652
(2007), which seems to tip the balance in favor of the First Amendment where
policy, rather than candidates, are the subject of discussion.
24. Citizens to Save Cal. v. Cal. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, No.
05AS00555 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005), http://www.saccourt.com/geninfo/
News_Media/Docs/0555FINAL%20RULING.pdf (preliminarily enjoining rule
that would impose amount restrictions on candidate-controlled committees on
both First Amendment and statutory grounds). The preliminary injunction was
upheld by the California Court of Appeals, but that court did not reach the
constitutional issue, holding instead that the rule exceeded the Commission’s
authority under the relevant statute. Citizens to Save Cal. v. Cal. Fair Political
Practices Comm’n, 145 Cal. App. 4th 736, 739 (2006). The case has now been
settled. Press Release, California Fair Political Practices Commission, FPPC Agrees
to Settlement in Citizens Case (May 21, 2007), www.fppc.ca.gov/index.html?id=48
&show=detail&prid=648 (last visited Dec. 23, 2007).
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that include listing major funding sources on campaign literature,
and filing regular and special campaign finance reports listing
25
contributions and expenditures.
States have also imposed
limitations on the content of ballot measures, in the form of subject
matter restrictions and single-subject rules designed to eliminate
logrolling of special interest provisions with generally popular,
26
Moreover, ballot measure campaigns are
unrelated measures.
subject to a variety of procedural requirements more onerous than
those imposed on candidates, including petitioning requirements,
approval by legislative bodies (for some measures), and distribution
of public information about proposed measures in the form of
publicity pamphlets and pro/con arguments sent to every eligible
27
Nonetheless, the differences between this type of
voter.
regulation and the source and amount restrictions imposed by
federal law lead to conflict when the activity regulated by federal
law intersects with political activity focused on state ballot
measures.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MODERN FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW
AND ITS GRADUAL ENTANGLEMENT IN STATE ELECTIONS
28

The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), the statutory
backbone of federal campaign finance law, was enacted as a postWatergate reform targeted at corruption of public officials through
25. See Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors & Campaign
Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295, 295 (2005). Even some
disclosure regulations have come under successful constitutional attack. See, e.g.,
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (requiring identification
of anonymous pamphleteer unconstitutional); ACLU v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979 (9th
Cir. 2004) (discussing constitutionality of requirement that funding sources be
disclosed on face of campaign literature). But see Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v.
Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1107 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding California’s requirement
of disclosure of contributions and expenditures); Elizabeth Garrett, McConnell v.
FEC & Disclosure, 3 ELECTION L.J. 237, 243–44 (2004). There are those who
advocate this type of regulation—unlimited contributions coupled with extensive
disclosure requirements—even in the candidate election context as a better
solution to what they see as the intractable problem of money in politics. See
Richard Briffault, Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 563,
564–65 (1999) (summarizing major schools of thought on campaign finance
reform). We do not address those arguments here.
26. WATERS, supra note 4, at 18–20 (survey of state restrictions on subject
matter and frequency of initiative and referendum matters).
27. Id. at 20–26 (survey of state provisions on petitioning requirements and
publication of voter guides).
28. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431, et seq.
(2000)).
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campaign donations and advertising. The legislation was an
ambitious combination of contribution limitations, expenditure
limitations, public financing for Presidential candidates, reporting
requirements, and the creation of a new independent agency—the
Federal Election Commission (FEC)—to enforce the law and
29
administer a vast public disclosure system. This scheme focused
on the activities of candidates for federal office and political parties
with regard to federal elections, and had minimal effect on state or
30
local elections.
The U.S. Supreme Court issued a mixed
judgment on the constitutionality of these reforms in Buckley v.
31
Valeo, which still generates controversy and sparks policy debates
thirty years later.
While Buckley upheld the constitutionality of contribution
limits, disclosure requirements, and public financing system, it
struck down all limitations on expenditures by candidates and
32
independent groups. The Court also limited the reach of some of
the most important provisions in FECA to address constitutional
vagueness concerns. First, the definition of “political committee”
(the trigger for contribution limitations and reporting
requirements for political parties and organizations) was limited to
those groups that not only passed the statutory threshold of making
expenditures or receiving contributions of $1000 or more, but
whose “major purpose” was “the nomination or election of a
33
candidate.” In addition, Buckley limited the reach of the term
29. The FECA was substantially amended after the 1972 presidential election.
Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974). It was these 1974 amendments that were
challenged as unconstitutional in Buckley v. Valeo. See generally Mark Alexander,
Campaign Finance Reform: Central Meaning and New Approach, 60 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 767, 805 (2003); Hasen, supra note 233, at 887–89.
30. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2000) (prohibiting national banks from making
contributions or expenditures in connection with any election to any political
office); id. § 441c(a)(1) (prohibiting government contractors from making any
contribution to any political party, committee, or candidate for public office or to
any person for any political purpose or use); id. § 441e(a)(1) (prohibiting foreign
nationals for making contributions in connection with any election to any political
office). The constitutionality of these sections were not challenged in Buckley v.
Valeo. See infra note 32.
31. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
32. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58–59 (upholding contribution limitations but striking
down various expenditure limitations); Hasen, supra note 233, at 888.
33. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79. For further discussion of the “major purpose” test
and how the definition of political committee continues to be a source of debate
in campaign finance law circles, especially with the rise of “527 organizations”
active in the 2000 and 2004 Presidential elections, see generally Lloyd H. Mayer,
The Much Maligned 527 and Institutional Choice, 87 B.U. L. REV. 625 (2007)
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“independent expenditure” to apply only to communications that
“in express terms advocate the election or defeat” of a federal
34
candidate.
Communications that fell short of this “express
advocacy” standard could not be subject to FECA’s reporting or
35
funding requirements.
Campaign finance reform advocates argued that the Buckley
distinctions were stretched into massive loopholes by FEC
regulations and lax enforcement in the 1990s, allowing more “soft
36
money” into candidate campaigns and political parties.
“Soft
money” is the colloquial phrase referring to money that is not
subject to FECA’s contribution limits, source prohibitions, and
reporting requirements (compliant funds are referred to as “hard
37
Moreover, a dramatic increase in advertising from
money”).
outside groups during the 1996 and 2000 elections that was
targeted at candidates, yet did not qualify as express advocacy,
38
The push for
increased the demand for additional reforms.
(describing the “problem” of 527 organizations and proposing various solutions
under campaign finance and tax law).
34. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44. This holding, accompanied by a footnote listing
particular words and phrases that would constitute such “express advocacy” such as
“vote for” or “vote against,” is referred to as the “magic words” test. Id. at n.52; see
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 193 (2003). The continued viability of this
standard was questioned by McConnell v. FEC, in which the Court stated, “[i]ndeed,
the unmistakable lesson from the record in this litigation, as all three judges on
the District Court agreed, is that Buckley’s magic-words requirement is functionally
meaningless.” 540 U.S. 93, 193 (2003). See generally Richard L. Hasen, Buckley is
Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v.
Federal Election Commission, 153 U. P A. L. REV. 31 (2004) (examining
McConnell’s impact on Buckley and as a part of a trend in new post-2000 campaign
finance rulings of moving away from Buckley).
35. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45.
36. See Craig Holman & Joan Claybrook, Outside Groups in the New Campaign
Finance Environment: The Meaning of BCRA and the McConnell Decision, 22 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 235, 239–44 (2004). With respect to reform organizations seeking
change based on problems with the Buckley decision, see generally Roy A. Shotland,
Act I: BCRA Wins in Congress. Act II: BCRA Wins Big at the Court. Act III: BCRA Loses
to Reality, 3 ELECTION L.J. 335 (2004). Complaints about the FEC’s enforcement
of FECA were ubiquitous before BCRA’s passage. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Gross, The
Enforcement of Campaign Finance Rules: A System in Search of Reform, 9 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 279 (1991); Amanda S. La Forge, The Toothless Tiger—Structural, Political
and Legal Barriers to Effective FEC Enforcement: An Overview and Recommendations, 10
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 351 (1996).
37. The official terms in the FEC’s regulations are “federal” and “Nonfederal” funds. See 11 C.F.R. § 300.2(g), (k) (2007).
38. See Spencer Overton, Restraint and Responsibility: Judicial Review of Campaign
Reform, 61 WASH & LEE L. REV. 663, 670–71 (2004) (discussing rise in “issue
advocacy” not regulated by FECA); Daniel H. Lowenstein, BCRA and McConnell in
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reform eventually resulted in passage of the Bipartisan Campaign
39
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA).
BCRA drastically expanded the reach of federal campaign
finance law related to raising and spending money by federal
candidates and political parties. For the first time, the law reached
out to regulate some activity by state and local parties, as well as
activity by federal candidates in connection with state and local
elections. Three main objectives of BCRA were to (1) eliminate
soft money from federal elections, (2) restrict “electioneering
communications,” (i.e. advertising from outside sources using soft
money that referred to a federal candidate in the final days leading
up to an election), and (3) limit the ability of state and local parties
or candidates to become alternative outlets for soft money to fund
40
certain “federal election activities” (FEA).
Many doubted the
constitutionality of this expansion of the law, and a coalition of
members of Congress and outside organizations challenged the law
41
immediately under the expedited procedures provided in the law.
42
In McConnell v. FEC the Supreme Court upheld the vast
majority of the new provisions in BCRA, including the ban on
raising or spending soft money by national political parties and
43
federal candidates.
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence noted one
consequence of BCRA and McConnell on future ballot measure
campaigns, stating “Title I bars national party officials from
soliciting or directing soft money to state parties for use on a state

Perspective, 3 ELECTION L.J. 277, 278–79 (2004) (same).
39. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat.
81 (2002).
40. Another major revision in BCRA, increasing the individual contribution
limits for the first time since 1974 and indexing those limits for inflation, is not
discussed here as it is not relevant to ballot measure campaigns. See Richard L.
Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 131–32
(2004) (noting BCRA’s main features as removing soft money from various levels
of political parties, restricting issue ads, and increasing individual contribution
limits); Lowenstein, supra note 38, at 279 (same).
41. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
42. Id. This article only briefly discusses the McConnell case for the particular
portions of BCRA that are implicated later in the discussion of federal campaign
finance restrictions on ballot measure campaigns. For more thorough analysis of
the McConnell decision, see, e.g., Hasen, supra note 34; Pildes, supra note 400;
Overton, supra note 38; Lowenstein, supra note 38.
43. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 161 (upholding restriction on national parties); id.
at 184 (upholding restrictions on federal candidates).
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ballot initiative. This is true even if no federal office appears on
44
the same ballot as the state initiative.”
Justice Kennedy is correct that BCRA’s restriction on national
parties (and likewise on federal candidates or officeholders) to
raise or spend soft money does not appear to depend upon a
federal candidate appearing on the same ballot as a non-federal
45
But the majority opinion
candidate or state ballot measure.
correctly notes that this restriction does not bar all strategy
planning between national party officials and state parties or
candidates about ballot measures; rather, it only bars direct
46
solicitation or spending of soft money by national parties.
As
discussed below, the exact application of these fundraising
restrictions to state ballot measures remains somewhat unsettled.
The McConnell Court also upheld the new “electioneering
communications” funding restrictions and reporting requirements
47
The Court held that BCRA could
as facially constitutional.
regulate advertisements that do not constitute express advocacy for
or against federal candidates because “[t]he justifications for the
regulation of express advocacy apply equally to ads aired during
those periods if the ads are intended to influence the voters’
48
decisions and have that effect.” The definition of “electioneering
communications” was not unconstitutionally vague, according to
the McConnell Court, and therefore did not require the statutory
construction used in Buckley to limit independent expenditures to
49
express advocacy. Thus, these BCRA provisions could reach any
broadcast communication, including advertisements supporting or
opposing state ballot measures that mentioned a federal candidate
within thirty to sixty days of a federal election to the appropriately
targeted audience.
In addition, the Court upheld the new limitations on FEA
50
conducted by state and local parties.
The Court held that
Congress had the authority to regulate some aspects of state and
44. Id. at 289 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
45. See 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)(1), (e)(1)(B) (2000).
46. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 160.
47. Id. at 201 (upholding electioneering communications disclosure
provisions); id. at 209 (upholding electioneering communications funding
restrictions).
48. Id. at 206.
49. Id. at 193–94. The definition of electioneering communication is
discussed further in the next section.
50. Id. at 173.
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local party activity, noting:
In constructing a coherent scheme of campaign finance
regulation, Congress recognized that, given the close ties
between federal candidates and state party committees,
BCRA’s restrictions on national committee activity would
rapidly become ineffective if state and local committees
remained available as a conduit for soft-money
51
donations.
The Court held that “[p]reventing corrupting activity from
shifting wholesale to state committees and thereby eviscerating
52
FECA clearly qualifies as an important governmental interest.”
The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that BCRA’s provisions
were “a new brand of pervasive federal regulation of state-focused
electioneering activities that cannot possibly corrupt or appear to
corrupt federal officeholders and thus goes well beyond Congress’s
53
concerns about the corruption of the federal electoral process.”
Instead, these restrictions on state and local party activity were
upheld as narrowly tailored to further an important governmental
54
interest. The new era of federal campaign finance law reaching
out to regulate parts of state and local elections had arrived.
III. BCRA’S EFFECTS ON STATE BALLOT MEASURE CAMPAIGNS
FECA, as amended by BCRA, does not mention state ballot
initiatives or referenda, and the almost 400 pages of FEC
regulations only mention ballot measures once, in an expired
55
provision.
Before BCRA, a series of FEC advisory opinions
exempted from campaign finance regulation most contributions or
expenditures exclusively related to ballot measures (as opposed to
state or federal candidate elections), based on both the statutory

51. Id. at 161.
52. Id. at 165–66.
53. Id. at 166. As noted in Hasen’s analysis of McConnell, the record of
possible circumvention through local parties was sparse as compared to the
evidence that the FEA restrictions would interfere with plenty of local activity. See
Hasen, supra note 34, at 49. See also Lowenstein, supra note 38, at 280–82 (arguing
BCRA improperly federalizes state and local activity in these provisions).
54. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 173.
55. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(a)(1)(iii)(A)(2) (2007). This provision expired on
its sunset date of September 1, 2007. Id. § 100.24(a)(1)(iii)(B). However, as
discussed below, the FEC has issued a proposed rule to make this provision
permanent. See Federal Election Activity and Non-Federal Elections, 72 Fed. Reg.
31473 (proposed June 7, 2007).
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56

language and First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti. But analysis of
the FEC’s post-BCRA advisory opinions and rulemaking reveals that
all three areas of BCRA’s expanded regulation (restricting federal
candidates’ involvement with soft money, restrictions on
“electioneering communications,” and restrictions on FEA by state
and local parties) have a real impact on state ballot measure
campaigns. First, the new restrictions on raising and spending
nonfederal funds in 2 U.S.C. section 441i(e) affect the ability of
federal candidates and officeholders to donate and raise money for
ballot initiative committees, and the extent to which these
candidates and officeholders can be involved in endorsing or
opposing certain ballot measures in their states. Second, the
“electioneering communications” provisions require disclosure of a
ballot measure committee’s donors to the FEC and can also restrict
advertising for ballot initiatives by committees that are
incorporated or that accept corporate donations. Finally, the FEA
provisions can restrict how state and local political parties fund
certain voter mobilization and public communications in
connection with ballot measure campaigns. Although it is clear
that these provisions all affect ballot measure campaigns, the
precise contours of the law are somewhat unclear due to recent
court decisions and imminent changes in the composition of the
FEC. This section will further discuss the rules in each of these
areas and explain how ballot initiative and referenda campaigns are
implicated.
A. Restrictions on Federal Candidates and Officeholders
Recent social science analysis has discussed how modern
candidates use ballot initiatives as proxy elections for issues and as a
57
Ballot measures can be a useful
catalyst for voter turnout.
56. See, e.g., Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 1989-32 (July 2, 1990), available at
http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/890032.html (noting foreign national contribution
prohibition is only applicable to candidate elections); Op. Fed. Election Comm’n
1980-95 (Sept. 19, 1980), available at http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/800095.html
(interpreting national bank contribution prohibition as applicable only to
candidate elections and citing Bellotti). BCRA actually amended the foreign
national prohibition in 2 U.S.C. § 441e(a)(1)(A) (2000), so that the prohibition
now applies to any “federal, state or local election,” removing the reference to
“political office,” which formed the basis for the FEC’s interpretation in Advisory
Opinion 1989-32. Pub. L. No. 107-155, tit. III. § 303, 116 Stat. 96, 109 (2002)
(amending 2 U.S.C. § 441e (2000)).
57. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Hybrid Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1096,
1098–1105 (2005) (discussing the use of ballot initiatives by candidates to
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strategic tool for federal candidates, as well as for others who wish
to influence federal candidate elections. Before BCRA there were
few, if any, federal law restrictions on a federal candidate or
58
officeholder’s involvement with a ballot initiative campaign.
After BCRA, section 441i(e) restricts raising or spending
nonfederal funds by federal candidates, including money raised or
spent in state or local elections and money spent by nonprofit
59
organizations. First, section 441i(e)(1)(B) provides that federal
candidates may only “solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend
funds in connection with any election other than an election for
Federal office” if the money complies with the contribution
amount limitations and source prohibitions in FECA. Second,
section 441i(e)(4) allows federal candidates to make general
solicitations for unlimited donations to nonprofit organizations
60
organized under section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code,
but only if that organization does not have a principal purpose of
61
conducting certain voter mobilization activities. If the nonprofit
organization’s principal purpose is to conduct such activities, the
federal candidate is limited to making specific solicitations for
donations from individuals in amounts not to exceed $20,000 per
62
year. These provisions extend beyond restricting the activities of
federal candidates because they apply equally to federal
officeholders who are not running for re-election, as well as to any
“entity directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained or
63
controlled” (“EFMC’d”) by a federal candidate or officeholder.
influence partisan voter turnout and strengthen interest groups). The current
analysis and data regarding the interaction between candidate and ballot measure
campaigns shows how far this practice has evolved since the days of Bellotti. See,
e.g., Richard Briffault, Ballot Propositions and Campaign Finance Reform, 1996 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 413 (1996) (discussing how separate ballot measure campaigns were
from candidate campaigns so that there was no corruption rationale to support
campaign finance regulation of ballot measure campaigns).
58. One possible issue that might have surfaced pre-BCRA would be whether
a federal candidate could donate campaign funds to a ballot initiative committee.
See 2 U.S.C. § 439a (Supp. 2004) (listing permitted uses for campaign funds and
prohibiting use of campaign funds for personal use).
59. See id. § 441i(e)(1)(B) (restricting solicitations and spending in nonfederal elections); id. § 441i(e)(4) (restricting solicitations for nonprofit
organizations). See also 11 C.F.R. § 300.62 (2007) (non-federal elections); id. §
300.65 (nonprofit organizations).
60. I.R.C. § 501(c) (Supp. 2004).
61. Specifically, Type I and II FEA as described infra section C. See 2 U.S.C. §
441i(e)(4)(A) (2000).
62. See id. § 441i(e)(4)(B).
63. Id. § 441i(e)(1).
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A series of FEC advisory opinions have addressed how section
441i(e) affects federal candidate involvement in ballot initiatives
campaigns. Advisory opinions do not have binding precedential
effect at the FEC, and each one is expressly limited to the facts
64
presented in the request. But the Commissioners tend to defer to
prior advisory opinions’ interpretation of a statutory or regulatory
provision in order to provide some consistency and predictability
for those who are interpreting the law and applying it to their
campaign activities. Since BCRA became effective, the FEC has
issued four advisory opinions squarely addressing various
applications of the new fundraising restrictions to ballot measure
elections, but these opinions do not present consistent
interpretations of the law. Because no clear FEC consensus
rationale has emerged on these issues, these prior interpretations
are subject to change as the Commissioners’ terms expire and are
replaced with new Presidential appointees who might not share the
same views as prior Commissioners. The most recent advisory
opinion regarding a ballot measure committee was issued in early
2006, and the changing composition of the FEC may affect the
outcome of advisory opinion requests regarding ballot measure
65
committees in the 2008 election.
1.

Federal Candidate-Controlled Ballot Measure Committees

As discussed above, the restrictions in section 441i(e) apply
specifically to any organization that is EFMC’d by a federal
candidate or officeholder.
Ballot measure committees are
sometimes considered candidate-controlled, although they are
66
usually tied to state or local candidates. Two different advisory
opinions discuss the issue of a ballot measure committee EFMC’d
64. 11 C.F.R. § 112.5(a) (2007).
65. At present, the FEC has one vacant Republican seat, two Republicans on
recess appointments, one Democrat on “holdover” status awaiting nomination of a
replacement, and two Democrats on recess appointments. See Kenneth Doyle, Fate
of FEC Nominees Still Unclear as Senate Committee Schedules Vote, MONEY & POL. REP.
(BNA), Sept. 25, 2007, at 1. These recess appointments are set to expire if the
Senate does not confirm the nominations before the Senate ends its session in
December 2007. Id.
66. See generally Hank Dempsey, The “Overlooked Hermaphrodite” of Campaign
Finance: Candidate-Controlled Ballot Measure Committees in California Politics, 95 CAL. L.
REV. 123 (2007) (arguing that present-day reality of candidate-controlled
committees makes the City of Berkeley rationale for limiting campaign finance
regulation of ballot measure campaigns obsolete); Garrett, supra note 57
(describing candidate-controlled ballot measure committees in California).
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by a federal candidate.
The first advisory opinion to analyze BCRA’s effects on federal
candidate involvement with ballot measure committees was advisory
67
opinion 2003-12 (Flake). While a candidate for re-election, U.S.
Representative Jeff Flake was working with a ballot measure
committee called “Stop Taxpayer Money for Politicians
Committee” (“STMP”) to qualify a particular ballot measure for
68
public vote in the November 2004 Arizona general election. This
advisory opinion makes a number of distinctions between types of
ballot measure committees and different phases of a ballot measure
campaign that affect how FECA applies. The FEC’s general
conclusion was that all activities of a ballot measure committee that
is EFMC’d by a federal candidate are “in connection with any
election other than an election for federal office” and, therefore,
governed by the amount limitations and source prohibitions during
69
the entire life of the ballot measure campaign. The FEC then
stated that STMP qualified as a committee “established” by
Representative Flake because, inter alia, as one of the founding
individuals for the ballot measure committee, he signed the papers
with the state creating STMP, he served as STMP’s first Chairman,
and one of his campaign consultants was the aid that helped STMP
70
with its state filings and opening its first bank account.
Once the ballot measure committee was found to be EFMC’d
by a federal candidate, a number of restrictions attached. Most
importantly, STMP was limited to raising a total of $5000 per
calendar year from any donor, and could not raise money from
prohibited sources under FECA (such as corporations and labor
organizations), even if state law allowed higher contribution
71
Thus, although
amounts or contributions from these sources.
Representative Flake could serve as STMP’s Chair and his
67. Op. Fed. Election Comm’n. 2003-12 (July 29, 2003), available at
http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/030012.html.
68. Id. at 1–2.
69. Id. at 6. In order to determine if a ballot measure committee is EFMC’d
by a federal candidate or officeholder, the FEC applies ten “affiliation factors” that
look at the overall relationship between the individual and the committee. Id. at
7. 11 C.F.R. section 100.5(g)(4) (2007) lists the affiliation factors such as whether
the individual has authority to direct or participate in the governance of the
committee, or whether the individual had an active or significant role in the
formation of the committee. See also id. § 110.3(a)(3).
70. Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2003-12, at 7 (July 29, 2003), available at
http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/030012.html.
71. Id. at 8.
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campaign employees could be involved in directing STMP’s
activities, all fundraising by Representative Flake or STMP was
72
limited to these restrictions.
Basically, because Representative
Flake established STMP, that state ballot measure committee was
treated as a federal political committee and was required to comply
with all amount limitations, source prohibitions, and reporting
obligations in FECA.
In contrast to the limitations placed on STMP, the advisory
opinion explained that ballot measure committees that are not
EFMC’d by a federal candidate or officeholder are not restricted by
section 441i(e)(1)(B) before the committee actually qualifies an
73
The FEC noted that
initiative or referendum for the ballot.
“merely encouraging voters to sign a petition” does not trigger
these restrictions and a federal candidate or officeholder may freely
74
encourage voters to sign petitions.
Commissioner Mason
dissented from this advisory opinion, but agreed with the
interpretation that the initial phase of qualifying a measure for the
ballot did not trigger FECA, while the later phase of a campaign
where voters are encouraged to vote for or against a ballot measure
75
could be considered “in connection with an election.” But he
disagreed with the interpretation that STMP, as a committee
EFMC’d by a federal candidate, was still subject to FECA’s
76
restrictions even in the first qualifying phase.
In advisory opinion 2006-04 (Tancredo), the FEC again
applied the EFMC’d analysis, this time focusing on a situation
77
where a federal candidate “financed” a ballot measure committee.
In his advisory opinion request, U.S. Representative Thomas
Tancredo presented different options for various donations to be
made from his campaign committee to a state ballot measure
committee (Defend Colorado Now or “DCN”). He also asked
questions about permissible endorsements and other interactions
78
The FEC concluded that Representative
with the committee.
72. Id. at 10–11. The advisory opinion also notes that any voter registration
activity that STMP conducted might have to be reported as FEA expenses. Id. See
section C below for further discussion of the FEA requirements.
73. Id. at 6; see 2 U.S.C. § 441i(e)(1)(B) (2007).
74. Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2003-12, at 10 (July 29, 2003), available at
http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/030012.html.
75. Id. at 2 (dissenting opinion).
76. Id. at 3.
77. Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2006-04, at 1–2 (Mar. 31, 2006), available at
http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/060004.html.
78. Id. at 1–2.
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Tancredo may donate campaign funds to DCN, but that the
amounts proposed would constitute “financing” because the
amounts proposed constituted providing funds “in a significant
79
amount” under the FEC’s affiliation factors. The advisory opinion
explains that Representative Tancredo’s first proposed alternative
of donating the lesser of $50,000 or 50% of DCN’s total donations
would be a “significant amount” and would result in DCN being
considered EFMC’d by the federal candidate under FEC
80
regulations.
The second proposed alternative of donating the
lesser of $50,000 or 25% of DCN’s total donations required the
FEC to look at the “context of the overall relationship” between
Representative Tancredo and DCN to determine whether it would
81
trigger EFMC’d status. Here, the FEC looked to facts similar to
the Flake advisory opinion: Representative Tancredo would share
polling data and strategy with DCN, he would use his own
campaign funds to run advertisements supporting the initiative, he
supported identical initiatives in the past, and he was closely
82
identified with the issue.
Based on the aforementioned facts,
together with a determination that such a donation would be
“substantial seed money” for DCN, the FEC determined that such a
donation would result in Representative Tancredo “financing”
83
DCN.
The Tancredo advisory opinion confirmed that federal
candidates may use their own campaign funds to pay for
advertisements endorsing a ballot initiative regarding an issue with
84
which the candidate is associated. The FEC also concluded that
Representative Tancredo can accept polling data from DCN;
however, this may result in an in-kind contribution subject to
85
FECA’s amount limitations and source prohibitions.
79. Id. at 2–3. Chairman Toner and Commissioner von Spakovsky dissented
and wrote separately to emphasize their view that an EFMC analysis should be a
totality of the circumstances approach looking at all ten affiliation factors and
disagreeing with the conclusion in this advisory opinion that DCN would be
considered EFMC’d by Representative Tancredo. See id. (dissenting opinion).
80. Id. at 4.
81. Id. at 5.
82. Id.
83. Id. Tancredo’s third proposal was to pay signature-gathering vendors on
behalf of DCN instead of donating money directly to the committee. The FEC
noted that the legal effect was the same as if the money went directly to the
committee, and therefore the analysis would not change. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 6 (citing FEC’s polling data regulations at 11 C.F.R. § 106.4 (2007)).
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The Tancredo advisory opinion should serve as a warning to
ballot committees that want to take donations from federal
candidates or officeholders (which is generally permissible).
Accepting too much seed money from an individual governed by
section 441i(e) could result in the ballot measure committee being
considered as EFMC’d by that individual, especially if the ballot
measure committee is also coordinating strategy or advertising with
that individual. Once that threshold is crossed, the ballot measure
committee could be subject to a host of FECA reporting
requirements and funding restrictions.
Moving forward into the 2008 election, it is unclear whether
the broad conclusion of the Flake advisory opinion (that any ballot
measure committee EFMC’d by a federal candidate is subject to all
restrictions of FECA throughout the campaign) would still be
applied by the FEC. In a concurrence to advisory opinion 2005-10
(Berman-Doolittle), two Commissioners partially repudiated their
votes on the Flake advisory opinion, stating “[w]hile we continue to
believe that the result in 2003-12 was substantially correct, we
86
Instead of relying on
believe that the reasoning was faulty.”
section 441i(e)(1)(B) regarding non-federal elections, these
Commissioners stated the better analysis was when a federal
candidate EFMC’s a ballot measure committee, and the issue is one
with which the candidate is closely identified, and the committee
spends soft money to influence voting for that ballot measure on
the same day that the candidate is on the ballot, then the
committee’s actions are actually governed by section 441i(e)(1) as
in connection with a federal election, i.e., that federal candidate’s
87
This approach appears to be a narrower
own election.
interpretation of the statutory restrictions in many ways. First, this
analysis would not apply when a federal officeholder (generally
subject to the restrictions of section 441i(e)) EFMC’s a ballot
measure committee when the officeholder is not running for reelection. Likewise, it would seem to allow a federal candidate who
is not on the same ballot as the ballot measure, to EFMC a ballot
measure committee without triggering FECA.
Since these
86. Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2005-10, at 2 (Aug. 22, 2005) (concurring
opinion), available at http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/050010.html.
However,
Commissioner Weintraub did not write any separate concurrence to the Tancredo
advisory opinion elaborating on this position. (Commissioner McDonald’s term
expired and he left the Commission at the end of 2005).
87. Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008

19

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 6
5. PERL -

ADC.docm

610

2/3/2008 2:31:46 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:2

situations have not yet been presented to the FEC, a definitive
answer would require a new advisory opinion request or perhaps a
rulemaking on this subject that would provide regulations of
general application. In the interim, ballot measure committees
should be cautious when involving a federal candidate in
establishing or financing the committee in order to avoid the
restrictions imposed by federal political committee status.
2.

Ballot Measure Committees Independent of a Federal Candidate

Two other advisory opinions have examined what is
permissible under BCRA when a federal candidate or officeholder
wants to become involved with a ballot measure committee that is
independent (i.e., not EFMC’d by the candidate or officeholder).
In this circumstance, the BCRA restrictions still apply to the federal
candidate, but do not necessarily attach to the activities of the
ballot measure committee itself as described in the Flake advisory
opinion. But the most recent advisory opinions indicate that the
restrictions on the federal candidate or officeholder depend upon
whether or not that candidate is participating in the same election
as the ballot measure and whether the ballot measure committee is
organized as a particular type of nonprofit corporation under the
IRS tax code.
In advisory opinion 2004-29 (Akin), U.S. Representative Todd
Akin asked a series of questions about donations, fundraising, and
advertising for two ballot measure committees in his state of
88
Missouri.
The FEC concluded that Representative Akin could
donate campaign funds to the ballot measure committees and
could also solicit hard money contributions to his campaign for the
express purpose of passing those funds on to the ballot measure
89
Consistent with other advisory opinions, the FEC
committees.
also concluded that Representative Akin could appear in, and use
his own campaign funds to pay for advertisements run both inside
and outside his district that supported or opposed ballot
90
measures.
The more complex question in the Akin advisory opinion was
whether Akin could appear in advertisements that supported or
opposed ballot measures if the ballot measure committee or
88. Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2004-29 (Sept. 30, 2004), available at
http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/040029.html.
89. Id. at 2–3.
90. Id. at 7–8.
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another independent organization paid for those advertisements
instead of his campaign.
The FEC applied its post-BCRA
regulations, stating that any “coordinated communication” between
a candidate and an outside organization is an in-kind contribution
91
to the candidate.
In that case, such advertising would be
considered coordinated because: (1) the advertisements would be
paid for by the ballot measure committee; (2) Representative Akin
would be “materially involved” in the creation of the
advertisements because he would approve the content and
personally appear in the advertisements; and (3) the
advertisements would refer to a federal candidate within 120 days
92
of the general election and be directed to voters in that district.
Because the advertisements would be considered coordinated, the
ballot measure committee could not pay for the advertisement if
that cost would exceed the contribution limit to federal candidates
or if the ballot measure committee was using money from
93
prohibited sources, such as corporations or labor organizations.
To apply the Akin advisory opinion to the 2008 election cycle,
independent ballot measure committees may accept donations of
campaign funds from federal candidates or officeholders, even if
those candidates appear on the same ballot as the initiative or
referendum. Federal candidates and officeholders may also
specifically raise money for their campaign accounts and tell
donors that the money will be transferred to an independent ballot
94
measure committee. Finally, although ballot measure committees
91. Id. at 3–7 (citing and discussing the coordination test in 11 C.F.R. §
109.21 (2007)).
92. Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2004-29, at 3–7. The timeframes for this last
part of the coordination test in 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(c)(4) have since been revised by
the FEC to vary based on the type of candidate referenced, but these changes are
subject to ongoing litigation. See Shays v. FEC, No. 06-1247, 2007 WL 2616689
(D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2007) (memorandum opinion).
93. Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2004-29, at 6–7. The FEC suggested that
Representative Akin’s campaign reimburse the ballot measure committee for a
portion of the costs of the ads to avoid any excessive or prohibited contributions.
Id. at 7.
94. The analysis of permissible use of campaign funds in the Flake and Akin
advisory opinions is somewhat outdated now since the rules on permissible use
have changed to include “any other lawful purpose” in 2 U.S.C. § 439a(a) (2000 &
Supp. 2005) and 11 C.F.R. § 113.2(e) (2007). See Final Rules on Use of Campaign
Funds for Donations to Non-Federal Candidates and Any Other Lawful Purpose Other than
Personal Use, 72 Fed. Reg. 56,245, (Oct. 3, 2007), available at
http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPAFR-CONTENTS/2007/October/Day03/
contents.htm. Thus, federal candidates need no longer show that the particular
issue of the ballot measure is something that they are closely identified with in
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may work with federal candidates and officeholders to prepare
advertisements that feature endorsements or statements of
opposition to particular ballot measures by the candidate, they
must be aware of the coordinated communications rules. Within
certain windows of time (ninety days before an election for a
congressional candidate and 120 days before the primary election
95
through the general election for a Presidential candidate),
advertisements targeted within that candidate’s district could be
considered an in-kind contribution to that candidate. If the ballot
measure committee is incorporated (even as a nonprofit), any such
contribution is prohibited under FECA and the ballot measure
committee would be exposed to liability for making an illegal
96
If the ballot measure committee is not
contribution.
incorporated, then the amount limitations apply to any in-kind
contribution to the candidate (which at just over $2000 can be
97
easily exceeded by paying the costs of an advertisement). In 2006,
the FEC specifically declined to create a “safe harbor” exception to
the coordinated communication rules for advertisements where a
98
federal candidate is endorsing or opposing a ballot measure.
Therefore, ballot measure campaigns need to be wary of these
coordination rules and take appropriate steps to avoid a FECA
violation when creating advertisements with a federal candidate.
The most recent advisory opinion, 2005-10 (BermanDoolittle), also involved activities by federal candidates in support
of an independent ballot measure committee, but presented a
situation where the ballot measure was not on the ballot in the same
99
election as the federal candidates. This advisory opinion request
from U.S. Representatives Howard Berman and John Doolittle
asked what fundraising was permissible for these federal candidates
in support of various ballot measures to be voted on in a special
California statewide election in November 2005. Representatives
Berman and Doolittle wanted to fundraise for independent ballot
order to allow donations of campaign funds.
95. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(c)(4)(i)–(ii) (2007). There are also different rules
regarding time periods for ads that mention a political party together with the
candidate reference. Id. § 109.21(c)(4)(iv).
96. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2000); 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(b)(1) (prohibiting
corporations from making contributions).
97. 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(b)(1).
98. Coordinated Communications, 71 Fed. Reg. 33,190, 33,202 (June 8, 2006)
(to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 109).
99. Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2005-10 (Aug. 22, 2005), available at
http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/050010.html.
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measure committees, but would not raise money for any
communications that would refer to either of them and that would
100
be distributed in their districts. The FEC’s conclusion states the
rules in section 441i(e)(1) regarding fundraising restrictions on
federal candidates in federal and non-federal elections and then
states that these restrictions “do not apply to the fundraising
101
activities” described in the request without further explanation.
Advisory opinion 2005-10 is an example of an advisory opinion
where a majority of four Commissioners agreed on the result, but
not the legal reasoning behind it. In advisory opinion 2005-10,
there are three separate Commissioner statements: a dissent and
102
two different concurrences with different legal analyses.
Commissioner Thomas argued in a lengthy dissent that both the
statutory language and past advisory opinions clearly indicate that a
ballot measure election falls within section 441i(e)(1)(B)’s
restrictions on fundraising in connection with “any election other
103
than an election for federal office.”
Thus, his interpretation
supported the two-phase approach in the Flake advisory opinion,
that once a ballot measure committee succeeds in qualifying the
measure for the ballot, the subsequent phase of campaign activity
leading up to the election should be considered governed by
section 441i(e)(1)(B), and federal candidates and officeholders
would only be allowed to raise amounts consistent with FECA’s
limitations and source prohibitions for those ballot measure
104
committees.
Commissioners Weintraub and McDonald attempted to square
the conclusions in this advisory opinion with the prior Flake
advisory opinion by reinterpreting the reasoning behind Flake (as
discussed above) and by generally characterizing ballot measure
105
Thus,
advocacy as “issue-driven” instead of “candidate-driven.”
these Commissioners argue that the potential for corruption is
lower and that a federal candidate’s involvement in ballot measure
106
campaigns is not per se restricted by BCRA.
Instead of a brightline rule that ballot measure elections are always covered by section
441i(e)(1)(B) (as argued by Commissioner Thomas), or are never
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1–3 (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 1 (concurring opinion).
Id.
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covered by section 441(e)(1)(B) (as argued by Commissioners
Mason and Toner), these Commissioners attempted to create a
compromised analysis that looks at the particular circumstances
surrounding the ballot measure election to determine if
107
restrictions are needed to prevent the risk of corruption.
Accordingly, if a federal candidate EFMC’d a ballot measure
committee for an initiative on the same ballot on which he is
running for re-election (e.g., the Flake advisory opinion), then
BCRA can appropriately restrict those activities. In contrast, where
no federal candidate is on the same ballot as the initiative and the
ballot measure committee is not EFMC’d by a federal candidate
(e.g., the Berman-Doolittle advisory opinion) there is no such risk,
108
These Commissioners also
and BCRA restrictions do not apply.
note that the exemption for certain solicitations for 501(c)
nonprofit corporations would allow a federal candidate or
officeholder to raise unlimited funds for a ballot measure
committee organized under that section regardless of whether or
109
not federal candidates are also on the ballot.
The disparate views of the Commissioners about how the
BCRA restrictions applied in this case illustrate why there are no
easy answers for federal candidates and ballot measure committees
who want to work together on state ballot measure campaigns.
Although there is no controlling rationale from the four
Commissioners, federal candidates may cautiously rely on advisory
opinion 2005-10 to support participation in activities that raise
unlimited funds for an independent ballot measure committee for
an initiative or referendum voted on during an election in which
110
there are no federal candidates on the ballot. There is also some
indication in advisory opinion 2005-10 that a ballot measure
campaign may reduce the restrictions on federal candidate
111
fundraising by incorporating as a 501(c) nonprofit organization.
But there are still limits on fundraising for 501(c) organizations
107. See id.
108. Id. at 3.
109. Id. (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441i(e)(4) (2002)).
110. Op. Fed Fed. Election Comm’n 2005-10, at 10 (Aug. 22, 2005), available at
http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/050010.html (concurring opinion) (“At the very
least, Section 441i(e)’s fundraising restrictions do not apply to referenda and
initiatives where, as here, no federal candidate appears on the ballot along with
the referendum or initiative, and no ballot measure organization is established,
financed, maintained or controlled by any federal candidate.”).
111. Id. at 6 (dissenting opinion) (expressing uncertainty about the
applicability of restrictions in 501(c) groups).
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that conduct FEA (which may reach many common ballot measure
campaign activities as described below). Moreover, incorporating
as a 501(c) nonprofit would also increase the potential for
advertisements that include federal candidate endorsements
running afoul of the electioneering communications and
coordinated communications regulations which are both subject to
the corporate funding prohibition. So again, there are no clear
options for ballot measure committees seeking to avoid BCRA
restrictions on their activities other than perhaps rejecting any
offer of fundraising or endorsements from federal candidates or
officeholders (which would seem to be very helpful for achieving
their ultimate goal).
Unfortunately, most of these questions were not answered in
the FEC's response to a 2007 advisory opinion request seeking
more definitive guidance on how Federal candidates can raise
112
money for ballot measure committees. In this request, current
U.S. Representatives Kevin McCarthy and Devin Nunes of
California specifically asked whether they may “freely raise funds”
for independent ballot measure committees supporting a state
113
ballot initiative regarding redistricting. In contrast to the BermanDoolittle advisory opinion, this request states that the ballot
initiative will be on the same ballot as both U.S. Representatives
114
seeking re-election (either the 2008 primary or general election).
The request also breaks this question into two parts, asking
separately about raising money in the pre-qualification phase and
115
the post-qualification phase of the campaign. This request also
specifies that the ballot measure committee is a 501(c) nonprofit
organization and cites the regulations governing federal candidate
116
solicitations for such organizations. Finally, the request stipulates
that any money raised by the candidates will not be used for public
117
communications referring to either of them.
Only two of the Commissioners who voted on advisory opinion
2005-10 considered this 2007 advisory opinion request
(Commissioners Mason and Weintraub). Nonetheless, the result
was similar to the Berman-Doolittle opinion: the FEC issued a brief
112. See Advisory Opinion 2007-28, available at http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/
searchao?SUBMIT=continue.
113. Id. at 1.
114. Id. at 1-2.
115. Id. at 2.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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answer with no controlling rationale. After citing the general rules
restricting solicitations by Federal candidates and officeholders in
section 441i(e), the advisory opinion states:
The Commission concludes that Representatives
McCarthy and Nunes may solicit up to $20,000 during any
calendar year from individuals on behalf of PAIC or other
similar ballot initiative committees not directly or
indirectly established, financed, maintained, or controlled
by, or acting on behalf of, either officeholder. The
Commission is unable to agree on a single rationale.
Further explanation is provided in the Commissioners'
118
concurring opinions.
At this time, all concurring opinions have not been released,
but the one page concurring opinion by the two Republican
Commissioners, Vice Chairman Mason and Commissioner von
119
Spakovsky provides some insight. That concurrence explains that
the $20,000 from individuals limit on the amount of funds that the
requesting Federal candidates can raise for the ballot committee
was derived from the section 441i(e)(4)(B) exception to the
fundraising restrictions for specific solicitations to nonprofit
120
Mason
organizations organized under 501(c) of the tax code.
and von Spakovsky, consistent with statements in prior advisory
opinions, instead conclude that the restrictions of section 441i(e)
do not apply at all and would vote to approve the unrestricted
solicitation of funds by Federal candidates for ballot measure
121
committees in these circumstances.
When the Democratic
concurring opinion is released, it will be interesting to see how
Commissioner Weintraub applies her Berman-Doolittle approach
to the situation where the federal candidates seeking to raise
money for the ballot measure committee are themselves on the
same ballot as the supported initiative. Evidently, the tax status of
the ballot measure committee is a salient fact in this analysis if the
answer depends upon whether or not that exception in section
441i(e)(4) is triggered. Without a consensus rationale approved by
the FEC, this advisory opinion does not confirm the continued
118. See id. at 3.
119. See Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2007-28 (Dec. 18, 2007) (concurring
opinion), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/searchao?SUBMIT=ao&AO=2
212.
120. See id.
121. See id.
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viability of the Flake opinion’s analysis of pre- and postqualification phases of the ballot measure campaign. Based on the
lack of consensus, ballot measure committees will have to continue
to tread lightly when involving federal candidates in fundraising
efforts. This is especially true for ballot measure committees that
do not have 501(c) tax status, but are instead section 527 political
organizations under the tax code.
3.

Ballot Measures as “Elections” Under FECA

The fundraising restrictions in section 441i(e)(1) only apply if
the federal candidate or officeholder is soliciting money in
connection with “an election for Federal office” or “any election
122
other than an election for Federal office.” In many of these past
advisory opinions, at least one Commissioner has expressed a
dissenting view on the threshold question of whether or not ballot
123
measures even constitute an “election” and trigger FECA. These
Commissioners have argued that the statute is expressly limited to
elections for public office and therefore does not cover any
solicitations by federal candidates or officeholders to support or
124
This interpretation is based upon the
oppose ballot measures.
125
statutory language as well as comments filed with the FEC by
members of Congress in response to the Berman-Doolittle advisory
opinion. The members stated that their understanding when
voting for BCRA was that these restrictions would not apply to
126
ballot measures.
Part of the difficulty with this determination is
122. 2 U.S.C. § 441i(e)(1)(A)-(B) (2000).
123. See Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2006-04 (Mar. 31, 2006) (dissenting
opinion), available at http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/060004.html; Op. Fed.
Election Comm’n 2005-10 (concurring opinion), available at http://ao.nictusa.
com/ao/no/050010.html; Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2003-12 (July 29, 2003)
(dissenting opinion), available at http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/03
0012.html.
124. See Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2005-10 (concurring opinion), available at
http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/050010.html (“[B]allot initiatives and referenda
are not elections for office as a matter of law under Section 441i(e) and, therefore,
the statute’s soft-money fundraising restrictions do not apply to ballot measure
activities.”).
125. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(1) (Supp. 2005) (defining “election” as “a general,
special, primary, or runoff election,” a political party caucus or convention to
nominate a candidate, a primary election to select delegates to a national political
party convention, or a Presidential preference primary election); 11 C.F.R. §
100.2(a) (2007) (defining “election” as “the process by which individuals . . . seek
nomination for election, or election, to Federal office”).
126. 11 C.F.R. § 100.2(a).
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caused by the different statutory formulations in different
provisions that create ambiguity about whether ballot measure
127
elections are governed by some, or all, of the FECA provisions.
Although the view that ballot measures are simply not “elections”
governed by FECA has yet to command a majority of four
Commissioners, this is an interpretation that could be accepted in
128
If
the near future with the changing composition of the FEC.
that happens, then the distinctions discussed above between
candidate EFMC’d committees and independent committees would
no longer matter.
Consequently, federal candidates and
officeholders could freely raise and spend money without
limitation in connection with state ballot measures. Thus, the law
regarding federal candidates and officeholders’ involvement in
state ballot measures is still a bit murky heading into the 2008
129
election year.
B. Electioneering Communications after FEC v. Wisconsin Right to
Life
BCRA prohibits the use of any corporate or labor organization
130
Broadcast
funds to pay for electioneering communications.
television, cable, radio and satellite advertisements fall under this
prohibition if the advertisement (1) refers to “a clearly identified
candidate for Federal office,” (2) is aired within sixty days before a
127. These different formulations include section 441i(e)’s “election for
Federal office” and “election other than an election for Federal office,” section
431(20)’s definition of certain types of Federal election activities as activities in
connection with “an election in which a candidate for Federal office appears on
the ballot,” section 441(b)’s prohibition on corporations, national banks, and
labor organizations making contributions and expenditures in connection with
“any election to any political office,” and section 441e’s prohibition on foreign
nationals making a contribution in connection with “a Federal, State or local
election.”
128. Although Commissioner Toner is no longer at the FEC, Commissioners
Mason and von Spakovsky are current members who have expressed this view in
the past. In addition, there could emerge more support for this position when the
vacant Republican seat is filled or the current recess appointments expire and are
replaced with two new Democratic nominees and one new Republican nominee.
129. Given the difference of opinion of various past and current
Commissioners regarding the proper statutory interpretation of § 441i(e) with
regard to ballot measure campaigns, and the potential confusion created by the
different formulations of statutory provisions cited above, this is an issue ripe for
legislative clarification. Any Congressional action to clarify the reach of FECA into
ballot measure campaigns should strike the necessary balance and consider the
constitutional implications of infringing on direct democracy. See infra Part IV.
130. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a), (b)(2) (2000 & Supp. 2005); 11 C.F.R. § 114.2 (2007).
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general election or thirty days before a primary election, and (3) is
“targeted to the relevant electorate” of the referenced candidate
131
(for House and Senate candidates). Individuals, associations, and
other unincorporated entities are not prohibited from funding
electioneering communications, but are subject to reporting and
disclosing of their donations if they spend more than $10,000 on
132
The FEC has statutory
such advertisements in a calendar year.
authority to make exemptions to this rule, so long as the provision
does not exempt advertisements that “promote, support, attack, or
133
oppose” (“PASO”) a federal candidate.
These funding restrictions and reporting requirements can
apply to radio and television advertisements supporting or
opposing ballot measures which mention or feature a federal
134
Since most ballot measures are included in federal
candidate.
primary or general elections, the electioneering communications
time period covers the last thirty to sixty days before the public
votes on that ballot measure. Therefore, unincorporated ballot
measure committees who wish to communicate to the public an
endorsement of a ballot measure by a federal officeholder (who is
also a candidate in that jurisdiction) in the days leading up to the
election may be required to report donor information to the FEC if
135
they spend past the $10,000 threshold. Unless the ballot measure
committee sets up a segregated bank account that only pays for
these advertisements, the report to the FEC must disclose the name
of any donor who gave more than $1000 to the ballot measure
136
committee from the first day of the preceding calendar year.
This level of disclosure might far exceed what recordkeeping and
reporting is required at the state level. Perhaps more importantly,
if a ballot measure committee is incorporated, or takes corporate
131. 2 U.S.C. § 434f(3)(A)(i) (2000); see also 11 C.F.R. § 100.29 (2007).
Communications that refer to a candidate for President or Vice President have
specific requirements. Id. § 100.29(b)(3)(ii).
132. 2 U.S.C. § 434f(1)–(2); see also 11 C.F.R. § 104.20 (2007) (detailing which
forms should be used).
133. 2 U.S.C. § 434f(3)(A)(ii), (3)(B)(iv).
134. See Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2003-12, at 16–17 (July 29, 2003), available
at
http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/030012.html
(applying
electioneering
communications funding restrictions and disclosure rules to ballot measure
committee advertisements featuring a federal candidate).
135. See 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(b).
136. Id. at (c)(7). If a segregated account is used, then the committee need
only disclose donors to that account in the last calendar year. Id. See also id. at
(c)(8).
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and labor union donations (if permissible under relevant state
law), the statute prohibits the committee from using corporate or
137
labor funds to pay for these advertisements.
These restrictions
can be onerous for a ballot committee trying to get its message out
to a statewide audience in the final weeks before the election.
Unfortunately, the FEC specifically declined to create an
exemption for ballot initiative advertisements stating that such
138
advertisements could be considered to PASO a federal candidate.
This decision echoed the same concerns presented in the advisory
opinions about candidate involvement in ballot measure
campaigns: “As ballot initiatives or referenda become increasingly
linked with the public officials who support or oppose them,
communications can use the initiatives or referenda as a proxy for
the candidate, and in promoting or opposing the initiative or
139
referendum, can promote or oppose the candidate.”
Although ballot measure committees did not get a specific
regulatory exemption, many of these advertisements may now be
free of the corporate funding restrictions (and possibly the
reporting requirements) for the 2008 election cycle after the U.S.
Supreme Court holding in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.
140
(“WRTL”).
In WRTL, a non-profit corporation challenged the
electioneering
communications
funding
prohibitions
as
unconstitutional as applied to specific “grassroots lobbying”
advertisements that the group wanted to run mentioning a federal
141
candidate within the electioneering communications timeframe.
The WRTL Court, now including Justice Alito instead of Justice
O’Connor (who served on the McConnell Court), agreed that the
application of the corporate funding prohibition was
142
unconstitutional. The principal opinion by Chief Justice Roberts
137. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2).
138. Final Rules on Electioneering Communications, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,190,
65,202 (Oct. 23, 2002) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pts. 100, 114).
139. Id.
140. 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007). Others have endeavored to provide a full analysis
of this recent decision and what it portends for campaign finance regulation in
the era of the Roberts Court. See, e.g. Hasen, Rethinking, supra note 23; Hasen,
Buckley is Dead, supra note 34. The case will be discussed here only briefly with
regard to how it may open the door to advertisements for ballot measure
committees that were previously restricted by the statute and FEC regulations.
141. See WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2660–61.
142. Id. at 2673. This holding came after an initial decision in the prior
Supreme Court term that McConnell did not preclude as-applied challenges to the
electioneering communications provisions. See Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546
U.S. 410 (2006).
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stated that it is only constitutional to subject an advertisement to
the
electioneering
communications
restrictions
if
the
advertisement is the “functional equivalent” of “express
143
Furthermore, the opinion provided a test: “a court
advocacy.”
should find that an ad is the functional equivalent of express
advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a
144
specific candidate.”
The Court held that the advertisements
WRTL sought to run were lobbying advertisements seeking to
shape public opinion about Senate filibusters of judicial
nominations, and therefore may have been reasonably interpreted
as something other than as an appeal to vote for or against the
145
candidate named in the advertisement.
Ballot measure committees in the 2008 election cycle can now
use WRTL to support running some advertisements featuring
federal candidates within the electioneering communications
timeframes without being subject to the corporate funding
restrictions in the statute.
This exemption would allow
incorporated ballot measure committees to use their own general
funds, and it would allow unincorporated committees to use
corporate and labor union donations to fund these advertisements
(if permissible under state law). After WRTL, an advertisement
supporting or opposing a ballot measure may not be
constitutionally restricted so long as there is any “reasonable
interpretation” of the advertisement other than as an appeal to vote
for or against the federal candidate endorsing or opposing the
ballot measure. Surely, it is a “reasonable interpretation” that such
an advertisement only seeks to influence support for, or opposition
to, the proposed ballot measure, much like the WRTL
advertisements sought to influence public opinion and the
Senators’ position on judicial filibusters.
The FEC acted quickly to implement the WRTL decision into
143. WTRL, 127 S. Ct. at 2659. WRTL actually included four views: (1) the
principal opinion written by Roberts and joined in full by Alito and in part by
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas; (2) a brief concurrence written by Alito; (3) a
concurrence written by Scalia and joined by Kennedy and Thomas; and (4) a
dissent written by Souter and joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Scalia’s
concurrence has three votes for overruling McConnell and invalidating the entire
electioneering communications statutory provisions instead of crafting the “asapplied” exemption in Robert’s opinion. Id. at 2684.
144. Id. at 2667.
145. Id. at 2670.
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its regulations governing electioneering communications before
the 2008 electioneering communication windows started in early
146
December 2007.
The regulations approved by the FEC exempt
advertisements that meet the WRTL test from the prohibition on
use of corporate and labor organization funds, but continue to
apply
the
electioneering
communications
disclosure
147
The newly approved regulation restates the
requirements.
general test from Robert’s opinion: that corporations and labor
organizations are prohibited from making electioneering
communications only if “the communication is susceptible of no
reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or
148
The regulation
against a clearly identified Federal candidate.”
then includes a safe harbor provision, i.e., a description of certain
types of advertisements that will be automatically deemed to meet
the exemption if all three prongs of the safe harbor provision are
149
met. Finally, the new regulation describes the FEC’s analysis for
advertisements that do not qualify for the safe harbor, but might
150
nonetheless be exempt under the general rule.
Ballot measure committees can use this new WRTL exemption
for advertisements supporting or opposing ballot measures and
featuring federal candidates. To qualify for the safe harbor, the
advertisement must either: (1) urge a candidate to take a particular
position on a legislative, executive or judicial issue or urge the
public to take a position and contact a candidate about the issue; or
(2) propose a commercial transaction, such as the purchase of a
151
product or service or attendance at a commercial event for a fee.
Ballot
measure
advertisements
with
federal
candidate
endorsements would not likely meet this requirement because the
advertisements would not be urging action by a candidate, but
urging the public to vote for or against a ballot measure. But, not
146. At the time this article went to press, the FEC had approved regulatory
text, but not yet issued its “Explanation and Justification” of the rules or published
the regulations in the Federal Register. See Final Rules Approved at November 20,
2007 FEC Open Session, available at http://www.fec.gove/pdf/nprm/election
eering_comm/2007/provisions_approved_nov-20-2007.pdf.
147. Id. at 3 (modifying the electioneering funding prohibitions in
forthcoming 11 C.F.R. section 114.2(b) and creating a new exemption in
forthcoming 11 C.F.R. section 114.15).
148. Id. at 7–8 (setting forth requirements for the new safe harbor in
forthcoming 11 C.F.R. section 114.15(b)).
149. Id. at 7.
150. Id. at 8–9.
151. Id. at 7–8.
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qualifying for the safe harbor does not preclude such
advertisements from qualifying for the general exemption under
the FEC’s new rule.
Ballot measure committee advertisements that focus on the
measure to be voted on—instead of the candidacy of the federal
candidate or officeholder appearing in the advertisement—should
fall within the general WRTL exemption under the two-factor test
described in section 114.15(c) of the FEC’s new regulation. Under
this regulation, the FEC considers whether an advertisement has
“indicia of express advocacy” or “content that would support a
determination that a communication has an interpretation other
than as an appeal to vote for or against a clearly identified Federal
152
The new rule states that an advertisement will be
candidate.”
deemed to have “indicia of express advocacy” if it mentions an
election, candidacy, political party, opposing candidate, or voting
by the general public, or it takes a position on a candidate’s
153
character, qualifications, or fitness for office.
Therefore, an
advertisement endorsing a ballot measure that urges the public to
vote for that measure could be deemed to have “indicia of express
advocacy” under this first factor because it “mentions . . . voting by
154
But the same ballot measure endorsement
the general public.”
could contain one of the three types of content listed in the second
factor by including “a call to action or other appeal that
interpreted in conjunction with the rest of the communication
urges an action other than voting for or against or contributing to a
155
clearly identified Federal candidate or political party.”
Ballot
measure committees should be able to meet this provision by
tailoring the advertisement to focus on urging a vote on the ballot
measure instead of commenting on the election of the candidate
appearing in the advertisement. Balancing these two factors
together, ballot measure committees should be able to claim that
their advertisements featuring a federal candidate have a
“reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote” for or
156
The FEC should issue additional
against that candidate.
guidance and examples in a Federal Register document in the near
future which ballot measure committees should consult when
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 7.
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creating such advertisements in order to take advantage of this
exemption.
WRTL has arguably removed most of the restrictions that
BCRA’s electioneering communications provisions placed on ballot
measure committee advertisements featuring a federal candidate.
Therefore, ballot measure committees should not have to worry
much about these provisions in the 2008 election cycle, especially if
they spend under the $10,000 reporting threshold. If a ballot
measure committee spends over the reporting threshold, the new
FEC regulations create a slightly different reporting requirement
for incorporated entities than unincorporated groups.
An
incorporated ballot measure committee is only required to disclose
the names of individual donors who gave the committee over $1000
in the prior calendar year expressly for the purpose of furthering
157
electioneering communications. General donations to the ballot
measure committee need not be itemized under the new rules,
although the committee must still file the rest of the FEC’s
required report for electioneering communications within a day of
the date of the first public distribution of the advertisement that
158
triggers the reporting threshold. The reporting requirements for
unincorporated entities described above were not substantively
changed, and a separate bank account may still be used to limit the
159
Additional guidance regarding the
donors subject to reporting.
scope of the reporting obligations for advertisements that qualify
for this new WRTL exemption should be available when the FEC
publishes its complete document in the Federal Register.
C. Restrictions on State and Local Parties Conducting Federal Election
Activity
Generally speaking, state and local political parties may not
use soft money to pay for any FEA, a term that encompasses a large
amount of voter mobilization and communications traditionally
160
FEA must be funded with
handled at the state or local level.
federal funds or a specific allocation of federal funds and “Levin
161
funds.” This compromise in BCRA allows state and local parties
to use some funds that are not fully compliant with FECA, but are
157. Id. at 1–2 (new provision 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9)).
158. See 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(b) (2007).
159. See Final Rules, supra note 138, at 1–2.
160. 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(1) (Supp. 2005); 11 C.F.R. § 300.33 (2007).
161. 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b).
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raised and spent pursuant to different restrictions. Levin funds
must be raised within the limits of state campaign finance law and
in amounts no greater than $10,000 per calendar year per
162
These funds may only be raised by the committee that
person.
spends the funds (i.e., no transfers between different party
committees or organizations and no fundraising by national parties
163
State and local party
or federal candidates is allowed).
committees who conduct FEA may also be required to submit
164
detailed reports about Levin funds spent and raised.
Unlike electioneering communications, the funding
restrictions on FEA do not depend upon a reference to a federal
165
candidate. Therefore, some activity conducted by state and local
political parties to support or oppose ballot measures can be
subjected to the FEA funding rules even if no federal candidates
166
are involved or mentioned.
BCRA created a structure where
there are four types of FEA: voter registration activity (Type I);
voter identification, get-out-the-vote activity, and generic campaign
activity (Type II); public communications that PASO a clearly
identified federal office (Type III); and services provided by an
employee of a state or local party who spends more than 25% of
their time on activities in connection with a federal election (Type
167
IV). Different funding rules apply to each type of FEA: Types I
and II FEA may be funded with an allocated combination of federal
and Levin funds, whereas Types III and IV FEA must be funded
168
The allocation ratios take into
completely with federal funds.
account the composition of the ballot in any particular election
year to vary the percentage of federal funds required. For
example, in a Presidential election year with a Senate candidate on
162. 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(2)(B)(iii); 11 C.F.R. § 300.31.
163. 2 U.S.C. §§ 441i(b)(2)(B)(iv), (b)(2)(C); 11 C.F.R. §§ 300.31(a), (e).
164. 11 C.F.R. § 300.36(b)(2) (requiring party committees that are also
political committees must report FEA receipts and disbursements for both federal
and Levin funds if they aggregate more than $5000 in a calendar year).
165. See 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(2)(B)(i); 11 C.F.R. § 300.32(c)(1) (noting that FEA
referring to a clearly identified federal candidate may not be funded with Levin
funds and must be paid for solely with federal funds).
166. Although the FEA rules targeted at State and local party activity, the scope
of the activity considered “FEA” also affects the ability of federal candidates and
officeholders to fundraise for 501(c) nonprofit corporations as discussed above
with regard to the Flake advisory opinion and pending advisory opinion request
2007-28.
167. 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(i)–(iv) (Supp. 2005); 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(b)(1)–(4)
(2007).
168. 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(2)(A); 11 C.F.R. § 300.32(b).
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the ballot in that state, a minimum of 36% federal funds must be
used, whereas in a year where neither a Presidential or Senate
candidate appears on the ballot in that state only 15% federal
169
These funding restrictions and reporting
funds is required.
requirements have already started to deter state and local parties
170
from funding activity that would be considered FEA.
State and local parties who conduct voter registration drives in
connection with a ballot measure campaign may trigger the FEA
171
funding and reporting restrictions.
Type I FEA covers “voter
registration activity” within 120 calendar days before a federal
172
primary or general election.
The statute does not define the
term, but FEC regulations state that Type I FEA covers “contacting
individuals by telephone, in person, or by other individualized
173
The regulation
means to assist them in registering to vote.”
includes examples such as distributing registration forms and
174
Thus,
assisting individuals in completing and filing the forms.
the typical canvasser who goes door-to-door, or stands outside a
supermarket with voter registration forms and information
supporting or opposing a ballot measure, could qualify as Type I
FEA so long as the activity occurs in the 120 days leading up to the
election.
State or local party efforts to identify voters sympathetic to the
party’s position on particular ballot measures could also constitute
Type II FEA (get-out-the-vote, voter identification or generic party
activity). Similar to the voter registration definition, get-out-thevote activities include contacting voters “by telephone, in person,
or by other individualized means, to assist them in engaging in the

169. 11 C.F.R. § 300.33(b).
170. See, e.g., Letter from Mark Brewer, President, Ass’n of State Democratic
Chairs, to FEC, available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/fea_definition/comm_
03.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2007) (commenting on proposed FEA rulemaking);
Letter from Scott R. Falmlen, President, Ass’n of State Democratic Executive
Directors, to FEC (Sept. 28, 2005), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/
fea_definition/comm_09.pdf (commenting to FEC regarding proposed FEA
rulemaking); Letter from Darryl Tattrie, CommonCentsConsulting, to FEC (Sept.
29, 2005), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/fea_definition/comm_
10.pdf (commenting to FEC regarding proposed FEA rulemaking).
171. See Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2003-12, at 15 (July 29, 2003), available at
http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/030012.html (applying FEA provisions to various
communications by ballot measure committee).
172. 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(i); 11 C.F.R. 100.24(b)(1).
173. 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(a)(2).
174. Id.
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175

act of voting.”
Specific examples in the regulation include
providing voters with the date of the election, times and locations
176
of polling places, or offering to transport people from the polls.
Thus, phone call reminders from the state party to voters telling
them the date and times of the election and urging them to vote
“yes” or “no” on a particular ballot measure could be considered a
177
FEA voter identification includes
get-out-the-vote activity.
acquiring voter lists and adding information about the likelihood
of voting in an upcoming election that a state or local party might
gather to indicate support for or opposition to a ballot measure in
178
an upcoming election. Finally, generic campaign activity includes
public communications that promote or oppose a political party
179
without mentioning any federal or non-federal candidates.
Therefore, a mass mailing supporting a political party and
promoting the party’s position on an upcoming ballot measure
could meet this definition.
Type II FEA is not subject to the 120-day rule discussed above
with regard to voter registration activity, but instead is determined
by a particular period of time in each state based on the earliest
180
filing deadline for access to a primary election in that state. The
Type II FEA time period runs from that filing deadline through to
the general election, and therefore can encompass a large portion
181
Any activity conducted during that time
of any election year.
period that otherwise meets the definition of get-out-the-vote, voter
identification, or generic campaign activity will be considered Type
II FEA even if the activity is targeted at a ballot measure campaign

175. Id. at (a)(3).
176. Id. at (i)–(ii).
177. The scope of this provision was discussed in Advisory Opinion 2006-19,
where the FEC decided that certain direct mail and pre-recorded telephone calls
to registered Democrats before a joint state and federal election did not constitute
get-out-the-vote activities because (1) the communications only promoted nonfederal candidates; (2) the communications were four or more days before the
election; (3) these “form letter” communications were not targeted to subsets of
Democratic voters; and (4) the communications only contained the date of the
election without the individual voter’s polling locations or times.
178. 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(a)(4).
179. Id. § 100.25.
180. Id. § 100.24(a)(1). The statutory limitation on Type II FEA was that this
activity must be “in connection with an election in which a candidate for Federal
office appears on the ballot.” 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2005). FEC
regulations implemented this statutory provision as a timeframe requirement.
181. Id. § 100.24(a)(1)(i).
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182

and does not mention federal races. Because this is a fairly large
window, most voter mobilization activity leading up to a ballot
measure election would most likely be covered in this timeframe
and could be subject to the FEA funding restrictions and reporting
requirements.
During the most recent FEA rulemaking, some state parties
expressed concern that activity in connection with wholly local
elections, e.g., mayoral elections or ballot measure elections, were
improperly classified as FEA under this approach just because that
183
In
local election fell within the larger Type II FEA time period.
response, the FEC created a regulatory exemption for voter
identification and get-out-the-vote activities conducted in
connection with a local election held on a different day than any
federal election if the activity referred exclusively to non-federal
candidates, ballot measures, or the date and polling times and
184
This exemption would cover
locations for the local election.
some state and local party activity regarding ballot measures, but
only when that election is held separate and apart from the federal
185
Moreover, this exemption was created with a sunset
election.
186
date of September 1, 2007. Although the FEC has issued a notice
of proposed rulemaking to make the exemption permanent (and
possibly expand the exemption), the current exemption on the
books has expired and a new rule has not yet been publicly
187
released.
Unfortunately, there are no definitive answers as to what ballot
measure voter mobilization efforts by state and local parties might
be covered under the FEA regulations. Adding to the uncertainty
182. Id. § 100.24(b)(2); Interim Final Rule on the Definition of Federal
Election Activity, 71 Fed. Reg. 14357, 14359 (March 22, 2006) (stating that the
FEA restrictions apply to "efforts related to non-Federal elections that simply
happen to fall within the Type II FEA time periods.").
183. See, e.g., Letter from Lance H. Olson, General Counsel, Cal. Democratic
Party, to FEC (June 3, 2005), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/fea_
definition/comm_06.pdf (commenting to FEC regarding rulemaking).
184. 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(a)(1)(iii)(A) (2007).
185. Id.
186. Id. § 100.24(a)(1)(iii)(B).
187. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on FEA and Non-Federal Elections,
72 Fed. Reg. 31,473 (proposed June 7, 2007) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 100)
(noting that even the proposed revised exemption would only apply to ballot
measures which were voted on in wholly separate elections from any federal
primary or general election, and it is unclear how many states would hold such
separate elections in 2008 apart from the Presidential primary, congressional
primaries, and November general election).
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is a recent U.S. District Court opinion striking down the FEC’s
regulatory definitions of “voter registration activity” and get-out-thevote activities as too narrow and not covering enough state and local
188
activity. Pending appeal or a new FEC rulemaking, however, the
current definitions remain on the books and in force for the 2008
189
elections.
This uncertainty may be enough to keep state and
local parties away from any voter mobilization efforts in support of,
or opposition to, a ballot measure that could be considered FEA.
But given the increased political party involvement with ballot
measures, it is more likely that local parties might unknowingly
stumble into federal reporting and funding obligations while
190
advocating their positions on a local ballot measure.
IV. STRIKING THE NECESSARY BALANCE
The recent requests for advisory opinions on the application of
BCRA to state ballot measure-related activities foreshadow the
conflicts that are likely to arise as federal regulation expands to
cover more activities with a potential impact on state elections,
rather than just activities expressly directed at the federal races at
issue in a particular election cycle. Other election reform
proposals that have been considered in recent years have brought
with them the same risks of conflict. For example, a reform
measure recently proposed to regulate the activities of
“unregistered” section 527 organizations would have required all
state ballot measure committees to register as federal political
committees and follow federal source and amount restrictions if
188. See Shays v. FEC, No. 06-1247, 2007 WL 2616689 at *83–86 (D.D.C. Sept.
12, 2007) (memorandum opinion) (holding the FEC’s definitions of “voter
registration activity” and “get-out-the-vote” activities unduly compromises the Act
in violation of Chevron step two and failed the APA’s reasoned decision making
requirement).
189. Id. at 93–94 (refusing to enjoin the operation of the regulations pending
appeal or further rulemaking).
190. The FEA rules also apply to an “association or similar group of candidates
for state or local office or of individuals holding state or local office.” See 2 U.S.C.
§ 441i(b)(1) (2000), invalidated by McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (2003);
11 C.F.R. § 300.32(a)(1) (2007). Because these groups are not allowed to raise or
spend Levin funds, any FEA voter mobilization activity done by this type of group
supporting or opposing a ballot measure would be required to be paid for with all
federal funds. 11 C.F.R. § 3003.32(a)(1). The FEC attempted to exempt these
groups from the definitions of “get-out-the-vote” and “voter identification,” but
removed those exemptions after a U.S. District Court struck these regulations
down as contrary to Congressional intent in BCRA. See Shays v. FEC, 337 F. Supp.
2d 28, 104, 107 n.83 (D.D.C. 2004).
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they conducted get-out-the-vote or voter registration campaigns in
conjunction with a ballot measure election held simultaneously
191
with an election for federal office.
These federal regulatory efforts stem from legitimate concerns
that the federal system of limiting contributions cannot work if
there are avenues through which unregulated money can have
substantial influence on elections. The 2004 presidential election
provided an excellent example of the effect that initiative measures
on hot-button issues like gay marriage can have on driving turnout
of voters likely to support the candidates of a particular political
192
party.
To the extent that political operatives arrange for the
presence of “sham” initiatives on the ballot in order to skew the
results of candidate elections, federal regulation of such initiatives
seems to be justified on the same basis as regulation of federal
election activity. Increasing strategic involvement of candidates
directly in ballot measure activities likewise justifies consideration
of the candidate corruption concerns that were once thought to be
absent from the regulation of ballot measure issues. The most
notable example of this phenomenon is California Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger’s unabashed fundraising and advocacy for
ballot measures to strengthen both his political base for re-election
193
and his bargaining position vis-à-vis the California Legislature.
Each of these bases for regulation turns on certain
assumptions about the intent of the political actors engaged in
these activities. We recognize as problems each of the putative
problems addressed above because of our implicit assumption that
the placement of “wedge issue” ballot measures in a presidential
year or the involvement of an elected official with ballot measure
campaigns is undertaken for the nefarious purpose of evading
otherwise-applicable campaign finance restrictions. But it is equally
possible that ballot measures on controversial social issues appear
on the ballot at the same time that candidates are discussing those
issues in their campaigns, simply because those issues are
something that voters actually care about. Therefore, they attract
191. H.R. 513, 108th Cong. § 2 (2006) (referring to organizations described in
section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986); Municipal Debt Refinancing
Act, S. 271, 108th Cong. (2003).
192. See Garrett, supra note 57, at 1101–02. See generally STEPHEN P.
NICHOLSON, VOTING THE AGENDA: CANDIDATES, ELECTIONS, AND BALLOT
PROPOSITIONS (2005) (analyzing the interrelationships between candidates and
ballot measure elections).
193. See Garrett, supra note 57, at 1105–07.
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both direct policy proposals and candidate attention. For example,
an elected official may be involved in ballot measure elections
precisely because she has been unable to advance a particular
proposal through ordinary legislation, and she is taking that issue
to the voters out of a sense of public stewardship and desire to
advance her policy agenda. Sorting out legitimate ballot measure
activity from illegitimate activities requires the kind of intent-based
analysis that the Supreme Court has eschewed in the campaign
finance context.
Accordingly, writing a narrowly tailored
regulation that applies to only illegitimate activities, without
including an intent element, would be impossible.
Thus, any federal regulation of state ballot measure activities
based on the theory that they provide convenient cover for those
who would avoid restrictions on contributions would likely need to
sweep broadly and cover all initiatives. Assuming that such
regulation could clear the First Amendment hurdle recognized in
the First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti and Citizens Against Rent
Control v. City of Berkeley cases, it would still need to justify the
substantial federal intrusion into state governance that such a
regulation would constitute. No federal court decision has ever
held that direct democracy at the state level violates any federal
194
constitutional provision.
It is difficult to see how such a
conclusion could be reached in light of the Framers’ own
insistence on popular ratification of the Constitution, not to
mention Congress’ express endorsement of, at least, the legislative
195
referendum at the state level.
In a federal system, at least some
deference is due to the legitimate choices of state governments
about the conduct of state government itself. Absent constitutional
violations, and given our founding commitment to consent of the
governed as a fundamental basis for the legitimacy of government,
it is hard to frame an argument that direct democracy is per se
196
Any federal regulation of state ballot measure
illegitimate.
194. In Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, the Supreme Court
refused to accept jurisdiction of a Guarantee Clause challenge to state initiative
lawmaking based on the political question doctrine. 223 U.S. 118, 151 (1912).
195. See U.S. CONST. art. VII; WATERS, supra note 10, at 3; THE FEDERALIST NO.
49, supra note 122, at 339; Budge, supra note 122; DuVivier, supra note 10, at 229–
30; see also Robert G. Natalson, Initiative & Referendum & the Republican Form of
Government, in THE BATTLE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING 17 (M. Dane Waters ed.,
2001). But see Engberg, supra note 17, at 578 (contending that Congress could
regulate or even eliminate ballot initiatives under its Guarantee Clause authority).
196. Cf. DuVivier, supra note 100, at 248–52 (arguing that ballot measures
addressing areas in which legislation generally fails and initiatives are particularly
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activity would therefore have to acknowledge the legitimacy of the
underlying system and comply with the ordinary constitutional
requirement that it not sweep more broadly than necessary in
remedying whatever ills formed the justification for federal
197
action.
Any federal regulation of state ballot measures should also be
conducted with a well-supported, nuanced understanding of how
198
ballot measure politics actually operate.
Reformers in this area
tend to paint the evils of direct democracy with a broad brush,
citing the influx of large-dollar corporate and union contributions
as a proxy for the existence of actual corruption and voter
confusion. Real data about the operation of the initiative paints a
more complex picture. For example, while more money in a race
may actually result in greater odds of victory (and thereby raise
equality concerns), in the initiative context, it does not have a
direct effect on success. Solid empirical evidence demonstrates
that spending on ballot measure campaigns has more effect when
that spending is on the side opposed to the measure, perhaps
because those efforts benefit from the voters’ predisposition to vote
199
The spectral image of big money
“no” on ballot measures.
interests forcing legislation through the initiative process therefore
does not seem to hold true, at least not as a universal matter. Nor
do all initiatives operate to the disadvantage of minority groups, as
exemplified by successful pro-rights initiatives and the defeat of
anti-rights initiatives even in states where the political composition
200
Moreover, at
of the electorate would portend a different result.
least some of the concerns about the majoritarian nature of
useful, such as political reform, matters of health and safety traditionally reserved
to states, and areas appropriate for social experimentation are due particular
deference).
197. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE
LAW OF DEMOCRACY 539–40 (1998) (discussing constitutional limitations).
198. See generally Briffault, Ballot Propositions, supra note 57, at 432–38 (detailing
the logistical problems of campaign finance regulation in the ballot measure
context); Elisabeth R. Gerber, The Logic of Reform: Assessing Initiative Reform
Strategies, in D ANGEROUS DEMOCRACY: THE BATTLE OVER BALLOT INITIATIVES IN
AMERICA 143 (Larry J. Sabato, Howard R. Ernst, & Bruce A. Larson, eds., 2001)
(analyzing various reform proposals in light of empirical evidence about ballot
measure politics).
199. Briffault, Ballot Propositions, supra note 57, at 427; Elizabeth Garrett &
Elizabeth R. Gerber, Money in the Initiative & Referendum Process: Evidence of Its Effects
& Prospects for Reform, in THE BATTLE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING 73, 79 (M. Dane
Waters ed., 2001).
200. DuVivier, supra note 100, at 242.
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governance by initiative can be resolved by the power of judicial
review, which extends even to initiatives, rather than by increasing
regulation of direct democracy.
In addition, any regulation that affects direct democracy
should consider the benefits of direct democracy, so that it might
avoid unintended consequences that would reduce or eliminate
those benefits. Direct democracy has been shown to increase voter
turnout and engagement, which in turn operates to the benefit of
candidate elections and the overall perception of government’s
201
Direct democracy has also provided a historically
legitimacy.
effective bypass for the kinds of political reform that elected
representatives are unlikely to accomplish, including campaign
finance reform itself, and as a forum for social experimentation at
202
the state level. Aligning ballot measure elections so that they use
the same structure of contribution limits as candidate elections
increases the likelihood of capture by the same political actors who
spend money and exert influence in candidate elections, rather
than providing an alternative avenue for otherwise unrepresented
interests to accomplish what they cannot accomplish through the
normal legislative process. Even those who fear that ballot measure
campaigns have been captured by big-money interests surely do not
wish to lose the possibility of enacting reforms that those currently
in power will not impose on themselves. Instead, a “hybrid
democracy” system, in which both representative and direct
democracy play a vibrant role, can result in better outcomes and
203
more respect for the will of the people.
Perhaps most importantly, direct democracy is a concrete
recognition of the foundational principle that democratic
government requires the consent of the governed, and that the
governed therefore have the right to choose the way in which they
will be governed—including the choice to reserve legislative
authority for themselves. Citizens’ use of that reserved legislative
power need not always be perfect to be worthy of respect. In the
words of political theorist Michael Walzer, the citizenry’s claim on
201. Id. at 236; see also David B. Magleby, Ballot Initiatives & Intergovernmental
Relations in the United States, 28 PUBLIUS 147, 148–151 (1998) (contending that
availability of the initiative results in more responsive elected officials).
202. See Garrett, supra note 57, at 1112; DuVivier, supra note 10, at 238.
203. See Garrett, supra note 57 (describing “hybrid democracy”); see also
THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE,
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 246–51 (1989) (advocating a “mixed model” of
democracy).
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the authority to rule does not rest on “their knowledge of the
204
truth.” Rather, the people “may not know the right thing to do,
but they claim a right to do what they think is right . . . . [I]t is a
feature of democratic government that the people have a right to
205
Individual reformers, and even elected
act wrongly.”
representative bodies, should think twice before imposing
regulations on this retained authority simply because they disagree
with some of the ways in which it is used.
V. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS
From the history of campaign finance regulation in the United
States to date, one thing seems true: because people who live and
work here have an interest in the outcome of governmental
decisions, they have an interest in influencing elections, and they
are willing to spend money to do it. Those who are particularly
committed to influencing elections and governmental outcomes
will be creative in their attempts to gain advantage inside (and
sometimes outside) the boundaries imposed by whatever regulatory
system is in place. This is the constant struggle of campaign
finance reform efforts.
Now that federal campaign finance regulation has reached its
current breadth, attempts to snuff out evasive contribution
restrictions inevitably conflict with the lesser and different
restrictions on related areas of political activity, including direct
democracy. Both the application of current law and any further
attempts at reform will proceed best by a careful consideration of
the interests at stake in both federal regulation and citizen
participation in direct democracy. This approach—provided that it
relies on actual information about how ballot measure campaigns
affect elections—will preserve the societal benefits of direct
democracy, respect the balance of powers in our federal system,
and avoid overbroad and unconstitutional restrictions on the core
political speech through which the governed express consent and
provide direction to their governments.

204. Michael Walzer, Philosophy & Democracy, 9 POL. THEORY 379, 383 (1981).
205. Id. at 385.
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